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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
A state-employed medical professional charged with 
assessing the clinical progress of a civilly committed sexually 
violent predator considered this detainee’s First Amendment 
activities in connection with her recommendation that he not 
advance to the next phase of his treatment program.  On 
interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine whether the 
3 
 
medical professional has qualified immunity from the resulting 
First Amendment retaliation claim.  Because the detainee has 
pleaded facts reflecting that the medical professional based her 
recommendation on the medically relevant collateral 
consequences of his protected activity, but has not sufficiently 
pleaded that the recommendation was based on the protected 
activity itself, the detainee has not alleged the necessary 
causation to state a prima facie case of retaliation.  
Accordingly, we will reverse and remand.  
I. 
 Appellant Debra Roquet is a psychologist at the Special 
Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel, New Jersey, where Lorenzo 
Oliver, a sexually violent predator with a long history of 
convictions for both sexual and non-sexual offenses, has been 
civilly committed to state custody for treatment pursuant to the 
Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:4-27.24 
to .38.  At the STU, treatment takes place in five phases, 
culminating in the detainee’s conditional discharge into the 
community on successful completion of the program.  At least 
once a year, the Treatment Progress Review Committee 
(TPRC) interviews each detainee individually and considers a 
broad range of materials—including reports from and 
interviews with representatives of the detainee’s 
multidisciplinary treatment team—in order to formulate a 
recommendation to the Clinical Assessment Review 
Committee (CARP) about whether the patient should progress 
to the next step in the treatment program.  
 Roquet was one of two members of the TPRC and, on 
its behalf, wrote an eighteen-page report (the “TPRC Report”) 
that described Oliver’s condition and recommended that he 
remain in phase two of treatment.  The TPRC Report 
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recognized that this was “not consistent” with the 
recommendation of Oliver’s treatment team, which had 
suggested that he advance to phase three of treatment, but 
concluded that Oliver “had not fully met the treatment goals 
consistent with completion of Phase 2.”  App. 31.  CARP 
approved the TPRC’s recommendation and Oliver thus 
remained in phase two.   
 The TPRC Report set forth Oliver’s statutorily defined 
mental abnormalities, noting that he suffers from, among other 
things, paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder.  In 
addition to providing a detailed overview of Oliver’s sexual 
and non-sexual offenses, diagnostic history, and clinical 
treatment, the Report summarized the results of the TPRC’s 
hour-long interview with Oliver, including that “[i]n general, it 
appears that he denies, minimizes or justifies much of his 
documented offense history,” App. 38, and that “[h]e did not 
demonstrate remorse for his crimes or empathy for his 
victims,” App. 39.  The Report noted that when asked to clarify 
his version of his offense history, Oliver was “confusing and 
ultimately evasive.”  App. 41.  At one point “[h]e 
acknowledged that he enjoyed the rapes,” App. 41, and at 
another point he stated that “[h]e ‘never’ had a rape fantasy” or 
did not remember if he had, App. 42.  The Report also included 
the following comment: 
[T]he panel observed that Mr. Oliver earlier asserted 
that he did not regularly participate in one 
recommended treatment component (AA/NA) because 
he was too busy.  He protested, stating that he is “fully 
participating in treatment” but he is “constantly writing 
for other people.”  He has written “[t]housands of 
pages” in 30 days.  This is because there are “2 
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paralegals here for 500 people.”  He said that he does 
this because he wants to help people. 
App. 42.  
 The Report concluded with a section entitled “Clinic 
Formulation and Treatment Recommendations,” which 
discussed the TPRC’s assessment of Oliver’s progress and 
made recommendations for the coming year.  This section 
contained the following passages: 
Note that Mr. Oliver is highly legalistic and 
knowledgeable, having received training to 
enable him to help other prisoners with legal 
matters while incarcerated.  Mr. Oliver also has 
a history of pro se representation in the 
community.  He reports that he gets satisfaction 
from helping others; however he has a history of 
abusing the use of his knowledge by charging 
fees for services, both in prison and in the STU. 
. . . 
Mr. Oliver continues to be legalistically focused, 
although he has managed to keep that out of his 
focus in group most of the time.  He continued to 
dedicate a great deal of time and energy to his 
role as paralegal providing services to other 
residents and he also produces a newsletter.  As 
he advances in treatment, Mr. Oliver may need 
to examine whether this focus deflects from a 
focus on treatment or whether it is counter-
therapeutic in any other way.  It is of some 
concern that he reported problems with officers 
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as result [sic] of these activities given that Mr. 
Oliver has an institutional history of conflicts 
with DOC when he was at Avenel that ultimately 
took precedence over participation in the 
treatment program.  The TPRC wants to see that 
he is not headed in the same direction at the STU. 
App. 46-47.   
 Proceeding pro se, Oliver filed a complaint in the 
District of New Jersey asserting five causes of action, only one 
of which is relevant to this appeal: Oliver alleged—based on 
the TPRC Report—that Roquet violated his First Amendment 
right of free speech by refusing to recommend him for phase 
three treatment in retaliation for his participation in legal 
activities of two general types—those he conducted on his own 
behalf, and those he conducted on behalf of other STU 
residents.   
Roquet moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but did not 
then assert a qualified immunity defense.  The District Court 
denied the motion to dismiss as to Oliver’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim,1 concluding that Oliver had “alleged 
                                                 
 1 The District Court, without prejudice, did grant 
Roquet’s motion to dismiss as to Oliver’s four remaining 
causes of action alleging violations of his constitutional right 
of access to courts (Counts One and Two), a violation of his 
rights under the New Jersey Patients’ Bill of Rights, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 30:4–24.2 (Count Four), and a violation of his free 
speech rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. 
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sufficient facts to allow the Court to draw the reasonable 
inference that his protected conduct was a motivating factor in 
[Roquet’s] decision not to promote him to phase three.”  Oliver 
v. Roquet, No. 2:13-CV-1881, 2014 WL 1449634, at *4 
(D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2014).  Roquet did not appeal that decision.  
 With permission from the District Court, Oliver filed an 
amended complaint, which Roquet again moved to dismiss.  
This time, Roquet did assert a qualified immunity defense, 
which the District Court declined to consider as Rule 12(g)(2) 
bars a party from “raising a defense or objection” in a 
successive motion under Rule 12 “that was available to the 
party but omitted from its earlier motion.”  Oliver v. Roquet, 
No. 2:13-CV-1881, 2014 WL 4271628, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 
2014).  The District Court thus denied Roquet’s motion to 
dismiss, but explained that Roquet could raise a qualified 
immunity defense in a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
under Rule 12(c) or a motion for summary judgment pursuant 
to Rule 56(a).  Id. at *3.   
Roquet did not appeal those rulings but instead re-
asserted her qualified immunity defense in a motion for 
summary judgment.  Oliver responded by requesting discovery 
concerning that defense, a request the District Court construed 
as a motion to defer the summary judgment motion and to 
allow discovery under Rule 56(d).  Although the District Court 
acknowledged that “courts have a preference for resolving 
questions of qualified immunity before discovery is ordered,” 
it concluded that “in this particular case, without any 
discovery, this Pro Se Plaintiff would be foreclosed from being 
                                                 
Ann. § 10:6–2 (Count Five).  Oliver v. Roquet, No. 2:13-CV-
1881, 2014 WL 1449634, at *2-5 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2014).  
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able to show that there is a question of fact as to whether 
Defendant knowingly violated his right to free speech.”  
App. 3.  The District Court therefore denied Roquet’s motion 
for summary judgment without prejudice, instructed the parties 
to meet and confer on discovery issues, and noted that Roquet 
would be permitted to re-file her motion after discovery.  
Roquet timely answered Oliver’s amended complaint and filed 
this appeal, and we appointed amicus curiae to assist Oliver in 
appellate proceedings.2   
 We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s 
denial of summary judgment.  Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 
544 F.3d 493, 501 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment “is 
appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).  We 
review a District Court’s decision to grant discovery under 
Rule 56(d) for abuse of discretion.  Murphy v. Millennium 
Radio Grp., 650 F.3d 295, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011). 
II. 
 
 We begin by addressing whether we have jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal.  Because we conclude we do, we then consider 
whether the District Court properly ordered discovery instead 
                                                 
 2 We express our gratitude to Stephen A. Fogdall of 
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP for accepting this 
matter pro bono and for the quality of his briefing and 
argument in this case.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the 
highest service that members of the bar can offer to indigent 
parties and to the legal profession. 
9 
 
of granting summary judgment to Roquet based on her 
qualified immunity claim. 
A. 
 Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity 
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 
(2009)).  When the defense of qualified immunity is raised and 
denied, a defendant is generally entitled to an immediate 
appeal under the collateral order doctrine so long as the denial 
turns on an issue of law.  Walker v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705, 710 
(3d Cir. 2002).   
 Here, the District Court said it was not denying 
qualified immunity, but rather was postponing its decision 
because, without discovery, Oliver would be “foreclosed from 
being able to show that there is a question of fact as to whether 
Defendant knowingly violated his right to free speech.”  App. 
3.  In light of that ruling, Oliver and amicus argue we lack 
jurisdiction over Roquet’s appeal because: (1) Roquet did not 
timely raise qualified immunity; (2) Roquet’s defense of 
qualified immunity has not been denied; and (3) even if 
Roquet’s qualified immunity defense were denied, it was 
denied on a factual, not legal, basis.  None of these arguments 
withstand scrutiny.  
 First, although amicus makes much of the fact that 
Roquet did not assert qualified immunity in her first motion to 
dismiss, “there is no firm rule” as to when a defendant must 
raise this affirmative defense, Sharp, 669 F.3d at 158, and the 
defense is not necessarily waived by a defendant who raises it 
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later in the case, Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 
204, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).  Indeed, it may be raised even after 
trial if the plaintiff suffers no prejudice.  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 
158.  Thus, Roquet’s failure to assert qualified immunity at an 
earlier stage does not divest us of jurisdiction over her 
immediate appeal.3  
                                                 
 3 It is also true, of course, that once a party has filed a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that party, with limited exceptions, “must not make 
another [such motion] raising a defense or objection that was 
available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion,” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2), and we are troubled by what could be 
viewed as an end run around this prohibition in Appellant’s re-
designation of her second motion to dismiss as a “motion for 
summary judgment.”  We note, however, that a defense 
omitted from an earlier motion may nonetheless be raised in a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); 
Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 
2015), and that the District Court, in rejecting Roquet’s second 
motion to dismiss, specifically instructed that “[t]o the extent 
that Defendant wishes to raise a qualified immunity defense, 
she may do so in a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Rule 12(c) or a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56(a),” Oliver, 2014 WL 4271628, at *3.  
Given the absence of discovery, Roquet’s motion perhaps more 
properly should have been designated as the former and the 
District Court might have rejected it on technical grounds.  But 
as the District Judge opted to deny it on the merits, in effect 
treating it as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
rejecting the legal defense it asserted in favor of discovery, we 
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 Second, qualified immunity may be “denied,” giving 
rise to appellate jurisdiction, not only where the denial is 
express.  In In re Montgomery County, this Court joined 
numerous other Courts of Appeals in holding that a district 
court’s “implicit denial of the Appellants’ immunity claims is 
sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction.”  Wright v. 
Montgomery Cty. (In re Montgomery Cty.), 215 F.3d 367, 370, 
374 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 72 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Even though a district court does not 
explicitly address the immunity claims [in denying summary 
judgment], we nonetheless have jurisdiction to review the 
implied denial of those claims.”).  And qualified immunity may 
be implicitly denied when a government official otherwise 
entitled to immunity is nonetheless subjected to “the burdens 
of such pretrial matters as discovery.”  Behrens v. Pelletier, 
516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
That is, unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of 
violation of clearly established law, “a defendant pleading 
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the 
commencement of discovery,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 526 (1985), and a refusal to dismiss is a ruling “conclusive 
as to this right,” for which immediate appeal must be available, 
Behrens, 516 U.S. at 308; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (concluding that if the actions alleged 
“are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed 
lawful . . . then [the officer] is entitled to dismissal prior to 
discovery”).   
 Third, Roquet’s qualified immunity defense was not 
denied on a factual basis but rather on an appealable legal 
                                                 
too will deem the defense timely raised and, as further 
discussed below, implicitly denied.   
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ground.  As explained above, the District Court granted 
discovery, reasoning that without it Oliver “would be 
foreclosed from being able to show that there is a question of 
fact as to whether [Roquet] knowingly violated his right to free 
speech.”  App. 3.  This ruling “may be separated into legal and 
factual components.”  Eddy, 256 F.3d at 211.  The factual 
component, apparent on the face of the order, pertains to the 
question of whether Roquet’s violation of Oliver’s right to free 
speech was knowing.  But the legal component, implicit in that 
ruling, is the District Court’s conclusion that Oliver had 
adequately pleaded such a violation and that the right violated 
was then “clearly established.”  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159 
(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231).  If Oliver’s complaint did 
not satisfy that legal component, then Roquet was entitled to 
qualified immunity as a matter of law, the District Court’s 
denial of summary judgment was erroneous, and its decision to 
grant discovery under Rule 56(d) was necessarily an abuse of 
discretion.4    
 Having satisfied any concern as to our jurisdiction, we 
turn to the question of whether Roquet was entitled to qualified 
immunity.   
                                                 
 4 “[T]he fact that we have jurisdiction to review the 
Appellant[’s] immunity claims does not automatically mean 
that we should also decide them,” but resolution is preferable 
to remand where, as here, “the issues are purely legal and ripe 
for review,” such that there is “little benefit in requiring th[i]s[] 
Appellant[] to press [her] claims anew in the District Court, 
and to risk yet further delay should that court’s ultimate 
decision lead to a subsequent appeal.” In re Montgomery Cty., 
215 F.3d at 374-75.  
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B. 
We start by considering whether Oliver has sufficiently 
alleged a violation of his First Amendment rights.  This 
analysis requires us to “outline the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to a state a claim for relief.”  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 
352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).  We will then “peel away those 
allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not 
entitled to the assumption of truth,” and assuming the veracity 
of the well-pled factual allegations that remain, ‘“determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”’  
id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).  
1. 
Mindful of the differences between the incarcerated and 
the civilly confined,5 we are nonetheless persuaded that 
prisoner retaliation actions are an appropriate starting point for 
our analysis of the elements of Oliver’s cause of action.  
“Retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his 
constitutional rights is unconstitutional,” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 
376, and this is of course no less true where the retaliation is 
directed against a civilly committed person, see Disability 
                                                 
5 As the Supreme Court has explained, “[p]ersons who 
have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more 
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than 
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to 
punish.”  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); 
see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) 
(holding that the commitment of a sexually violent predator 
under state statute did not implicate the objectives of criminal 
punishment). 
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Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 
F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[C]ommitted individuals are 
entitled to at least as much constitutional protection in this 
context as prisoners.”); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
315-16 (1982) (“If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold 
convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be 
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed—who 
may not be punished at all—in unsafe conditions.”). 
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner 
plaintiff must allege (1) “that the conduct which led to the 
alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected”; (2) “that he 
suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of the prison 
officials”; and (3) “a causal link between the exercise of his 
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him,” 
or more specifically, “that his constitutionally protected 
conduct was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the 
decision” to take that action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 
333 (3d Cir. 2001).  Once the prisoner has made his prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it “would have made the 
same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Id. at 
334. 
In this case, the parties dispute what is required under 
the causation prong of the Rauser test and whether Oliver has 
alleged facts giving rise to the inference that his protected 
activity was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the decision 
not to advance him.6   The challenge here is that, although 
                                                 
 6 Although the parties agree that Oliver has sufficiently 
alleged his engagement in protected legal activity, they 
disagree and devote much of their briefs to the question of 
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Oliver makes the conclusory allegation in his complaint that he 
suffered an adverse action based on his protected activity, the 
facts that Oliver alleges to support that causal link are drawn 
from the TPRC Report,  and nothing in the Report—which we 
may consider in its entirety in this context as a “document 
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted)—suggests that Oliver’s 
litigation activity itself was the basis of Roquet’s 
recommendation.7  Rather, on its face, the Report reflects that, 
to the extent Roquet considered Oliver’s litigation activity in 
recommending against his advancement, it was only to note 
                                                 
whether Roquet’s recommendation that Oliver remain in the 
second phase of treatment constituted an adverse action.  
Roquet argues that “[a] non-binding recommendation cannot 
possibly be an adverse action to which one is ‘subjected,’” 
Appellant’s Br. 15, while Oliver argues that CARP’s decision 
“relie[d] totally on the TPRC’s [R]eport,” Appellee’s Br. 13.  
Given our conclusion as to the causation prong in this case, we 
need not decide whether Roquet’s recommendation was 
“sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his First Amendment rights,” such that it would 
qualify as an adverse action.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 
187, 194 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 7 While Oliver refers only to certain sections of the 
Report in his amended complaint, Roquet included the entire 
Report in the appendix to her motion, and we “may consider 
an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches 
as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are 
based on the document,” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White 
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  
16 
 
that certain problematic behaviors on which the 
recommendation was based—including Oliver being 
distracted from his treatment, his manipulative behavior, and 
his hostile relationship with STU staff—manifested 
themselves in Oliver’s litigation activities.   
Oliver does not argue that it was impermissible for 
Roquet to base her recommendation on those behaviors; 
instead, his argument seems to be that because the Report 
reflects that Roquet identified his litigation activity as 
associated with those behaviors, Oliver has sufficiently 
pleaded causation.  In other words, Oliver contends that by 
alleging a medical professional considered protected activity at 
all, even if only as a symptom of or giving rise to medically 
relevant behaviors, a plaintiff can satisfy Rauser’s causation 
prong at the pleading stage.  That cannot be, and is not, the law.  
To understand why more is needed in this context, we briefly 
review the Supreme Court’s and our jurisprudence related to 
this causation question.  
We derived the Rauser framework, in significant part, 
from Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977), the Supreme Court’s decision on retaliation claims 
arising in the public employment context.  The tests developed 
by the Court in Mount Healthy and our Court in Rauser to 
assess retaliation claims reflect the premise that protected 
activity is virtually never a permissible basis for state 
employees to take adverse action, much the way protected 
characteristics like race or sex are presumptively invalid bases 
for state action in the discrimination context.  See, e.g., 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); 
Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 556 (2007) 
(drawing a parallel between the “methods for identifying the 
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presence of an illicit reason” established by the Supreme Court 
in the retaliation and discrimination contexts).  Because it is 
generally impermissible for a state actor to hinge an adverse 
decision on such an activity or characteristic, any consideration 
of the activity or characteristic in the decision-making process 
leading to the adverse action is, in the normal course, sufficient 
to satisfy the causation element of a prima facie retaliation or 
discrimination case.  See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282-
87; Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 
560-61 (3d Cir. 2002).  
This premise makes sense in most cases, as there is 
rarely a valid reason for a state actor to even consider a 
person’s protected activity or characteristics like race and 
gender when evaluating if an adverse action is appropriate.  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that there 
will be exceptions to this general rule, and that allegations of 
mere consideration of protected activity will not always be 
enough to plead causation in a retaliation case.  Instead, as the 
Court explained in Hartman v. Moore, the necessary “proof of 
a connection” between the protected activity and the adverse 
action will “depend on the circumstances.”8  547 U.S. 250, 263 
(2006).   
                                                 
8 In that case, the Supreme Court adjusted the 
requirements of the causation prong of a prima facie retaliation 
claim to reflect the unique circumstances of a retaliatory 
prosecution claim against a federal agent, which the Court 
recognized presented an unusual problem because a plaintiff 
may only bring the claim against a non-prosecuting 
government agent, rather than the prosecutor himself, even 
though it is ultimately the prosecutor’s decision whether or not 
to bring criminal charges.  Id. at 263.  Although the Court 
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When evaluating what allegations will satisfy this 
requirement, we also must consider the pleading standards set 
forth in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
That is, a plaintiff’s allegations “must be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
555, and must reflect “more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  A 
plaintiff’s “bare assertions . . . amount[ing to] nothing more 
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional 
[retaliation] claim,” will not suffice.  Id at 681 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  
With these standards in mind, it is clear that, in the 
context of a retaliation claim against a mental health 
professional at a state institution, a prima facie showing of 
causation requires more than the allegation that the 
professional based a medical decision on symptomology that 
happened to relate in some way to a patient’s protected activity.  
There must be particular facts alleged that allow the court to 
reasonably infer it is the protected activity itself, and not 
simply medically relevant behavior associated with that 
activity, that formed the basis of the defendant’s adverse 
action.  This is so because a medical professional’s holistic 
                                                 
acknowledged that the requirement it was adding, a showing 
of the absence of probable cause to prosecute, would “not 
necessarily [be] dispositive” in every case, id. at 265, it also 
observed that the “complexity” of the causation issue needed 
to be “addressed specifically in defining the elements of the 
tort,” id., and therefore concluded “it makes sense to require 
such a showing as an element of a plaintiff’s case . . . that [] 
must be pleaded and proven,” id. at 265-66.  
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approach to diagnosing a patient’s mental health will 
sometimes require consideration of his otherwise protected 
speech and conduct to evaluate any adverse consequences they 
are having on his treatment.  Framed in terms of the Rauser test 
and the relevant pleading standards, an assertion by a mental 
health detainee that his treating psychologist retaliated against 
him, based only on the factual allegation that the psychologist 
considered the effect his First Amendment activity was having 
on his treatment, would not support the inference that 
retaliation was the “substantial or motivating factor” for the 
psychologist’s recommendation.   
Suppose, for example, that a state-employed 
psychologist ordered continued detention and treatment of a 
detainee with paranoid schizophrenia based, among other 
things, on her observation that the detainee’s obsessive filing 
of complaints alleging conspiracy theories was symptomatic of 
continued paranoia and had consumed his time to the exclusion 
of therapeutic activities.  We could hardly say the 
psychologist’s “consideration of” the detainee’s protected 
activity—to the extent the psychologist simply noted its 
association with the symptomology on which her medical 
decision was based—was sufficient alone to plead causation 
and to create an inference of retaliation.  Indeed, to conclude 
otherwise would create a perverse incentive for psychologists 
to ignore medically relevant detainee behaviors simply because 
those behaviors coincidentally involve conduct protected by 
the First Amendment.  As demonstrated by this example, the 
mere allegation that a mental health professional considered a 
patient’s protected activity to be associated in some way with 
the medically relevant conduct on which the adverse action, on 
its face, was based will not raise the patient’s right to relief 
“above the speculative level.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  
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Our holding is also supported by the Supreme Court’s 
repeated admonitions that we owe deference to medical 
professionals in both the prison and civil commitment contexts.  
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 232 (1990); Parham 
v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).  Most notably, in Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), because of the special expertise 
of medical professionals regarding those institutionally 
committed to their care—and the need to minimize 
“interference by the federal judiciary with the internal 
operations of [state] institutions”—the Supreme Court stressed 
judicial deference to their treatment decisions and expressed 
concerns about imposing upon them standards that would force 
them to make judgments “in the shadow of” legal liability.  Id. 
at 322, 325.  To determine whether intellectually disabled 
individuals who have been involuntarily committed can 
recover damages against doctors and other experts responsible 
for their treatment, the Court ultimately held in that case that 
medical professionals’ decisions are “presumptively valid” and 
“liability may be imposed only when the decision by the 
professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate 
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision 
on such a judgment.”  Id. at 323.  Requiring that a prima facie 
case of retaliation involve more than just the allegation that a 
psychologist took account of facially relevant medical 
behaviors—including those associated in some way with a 
patient’s protected activity—is consistent with the 
“presumptive validity” we accord to these professionals’ 
medical judgment.  
This requirement for pleading causation in the context 
of a mental health professional’s clinical decisions also aligns 
with New Jersey’s legitimate state interest in providing 
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appropriate rehabilitation to sexually violent offenders.  New 
Jersey’s statutory system is designed to balance the rights of 
the individual with “the purpose of ensuring that the person 
participates in necessary treatment and that the person does not 
represent a risk to public safety.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-
27.32(c)(2).  The same provision that charges the STU with 
“provid[ing] or arrang[ing] for custodial care” of sexually 
violent predators specifies that “the rights and rules of conduct 
applicable to a person subject to involuntary commitment as a 
sexually violent predator” are to be established by regulations 
that “specifically address the differing needs and specific 
characteristics of, and treatment protocols related to, sexually 
violent predators.”  Id. § 30:4-27.34(a), (d).   In short, the 
constitutional rights of those committed under the state statute 
are not absolute but are subject to treatment protocols designed 
to ensure fulfillment of the objectives of their commitment and 
rehabilitation.  To hold that a prima facie case of retaliation 
could be established merely by alleging that a medical 
professional considered the effect a detainee’s protected 
activity was having on his treatment would motivate those 
responsible for administering this system to refrain from 
addressing behavior often pertinent to a detainee’s treatment 
and would undercut New Jersey’s legitimate interest in 
rehabilitating its sexually violent offenders.  
For all of these reasons, we conclude that in order to 
satisfy the third element of a prima facie case under Rauser—
that the plaintiff’s protected activity was a “substantial or 
motivating factor” for the defendant’s adverse action—Oliver 
must allege that it is his protected activity itself, not just the 
medically relevant collateral consequences of that activity, that 
played a role in Roquet’s recommendation not to advance 
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him.9  We now proceed to determine whether Oliver has met 
this burden. 
2. 
 Applying these principles here, we conclude that Oliver 
has failed to state a retaliation claim.  No facts on the face of 
Oliver’s complaint or the TPRC Report suggest that Oliver’s 
protected activity itself, rather than medically relevant 
collateral consequences of that activity, was the basis of 
Roquet’s recommendation.  The Report expresses concern that 
Oliver’s litigation activity is a significant distraction from his 
treatment, as Oliver’s own comments reflect that he is so 
                                                 
 9 Some Courts of Appeals have arrived at a similar result 
at the summary judgment stage, holding that liability cannot be 
imposed where a medical professional considers a detainee’s 
protected expression for legitimate reasons concerning the 
implications of that expression for the detainee’s mental health.  
See, e.g., Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming a grant of summary judgment to a state mental 
health evaluator where the detainee plaintiff alleged the 
evaluator violated his First Amendment rights by basing his 
conclusion that the detainee was delusional and 
recommendation that detainee be taken into custody on 
political statements detainee made on an online social media 
website).  For the reasons discussed above, however, we 
conclude that—at least in the context of mental health 
evaluations of the civilly committed, which is the only context 
we address today—whether a detainee’s allegations reflect 
consideration of his protected activity itself or only the 
collateral consequences of such activity is appropriately 
addressed in connection with causation at the pleading stage.   
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consumed by his legal activities that he failed to participate in 
a recommended component of his treatment program.  The 
Report further reflects that Oliver has manipulated other 
inmates and abused the power these activities vest in him by 
charging fees for legal services both during his prior 
incarceration and his current civil confinement, and that he has 
created hostility with officers at the program through his 
protected activity.  Roquet elaborated that she found Oliver’s 
acknowledged conflicts with the STU staff particularly 
concerning, as he has a “history” of similar animosity and these 
conflicts “ultimately took precedence over [Oliver’s] 
participating in the treatment program” in the past.  App. 47.   
 
 Oliver has not alleged that any of these medical 
observations, which appear to be appropriate and reasonable 
on their face, are not true or are exaggerated.  Instead, he 
simply asserts that Roquet’s description of him as “legalistic,” 
and her observation that he devotes a lot of his time to his 
litigation activities, “are clearly directed at [Oliver’s] legal 
activit[y]” itself.  App. 17-18.  This unsupported conclusory 
assertion based on statements taken largely out of context is 
not sufficient to plead causation.   
 
 We recognize there may be cases where a medical 
report purporting to focus only on the collateral consequences 
of a detainee’s First Amendment activity could be sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation plaintiff where the 
plaintiff is able to plead “consideration plus,”—i.e., where, in 
addition to consideration of the protected activity by way of its 
association with medically relevant conduct, there are specific 
factual allegations supporting an inference that the adverse 
action was based on the protected activity itself.  For example, 
a prima facie case might be established if there were specific 
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factual allegations suggesting that the collateral consequences 
were fabricated, that the defendant had communicated anger or 
frustration with the protected activity itself or had threatened 
to take action against the plaintiff, or that the collateral 
consequences relied upon were irrelevant to the medical 
judgment in question.   
 
Here, however, to the extent any such “plus” factors can 
be gleaned from Oliver’s complaint, they amount to no more 
than speculation that Roquet based her recommendation on 
anything other than the medically relevant conduct that 
pervades her report.   For example, Oliver identifies specific 
instances of protected activity in which he engaged prior to 
Roquet’s recommendation not to advance him, alleging that 
Roquet “deprived [him] of his [c]onstitutional [r]ights” 
because he wrote articles in a newsletter, filed a petition to 
remove class counsel in an unrelated civil rights case, and 
assisted other residents in their filing of legal grievances 
against the STU.  App. 23.  But these allegations plead the 
element of protected activity, not causation, and the conclusory 
statement that this activity is what deprived him of his 
constitutional rights is exactly the type of “bare assertion[]” 
that the Supreme Court has held amounts to “nothing more 
than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional 
[retaliation] claim.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555).  
 
Oliver also alleges that he has assisted other detainees 
in their suits against various other members of the TPRC, 
including another doctor who is a friend of Roquet’s.  But 
where Roquet was not the subject of, or involved with, those 
complaints in any way, those allegations support nothing more 
than “a sheer possibility” that Roquet had a motive to retaliate 
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against him, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and cannot stand in for a 
causal link that is missing.  Absent supporting facts that make 
it reasonable to draw an inference of retaliation, these 
conclusory assertions of a cause-and-effect relationship 
between specific protected activities and a later adverse action 
are insufficient to plead causation.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; 
see also Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 
253 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that allegations “sufficient to raise 
the inference that [plaintiff’s] engagement in a protected 
activity was the likely reason for the [defendant’s] adverse 
action” are necessary to state a prima facie claim of retaliation 
under Title VII).  
 
  Perhaps in an attempt to establish, by process of 
elimination, that only a retaliatory motive could account for 
Roquet’s recommendation, Oliver also alleges that he met all 
of the goals and expectations outlined in the STU Residents 
Handbook.  But again, Oliver offers but a bare allegation, 
which the TPRC Report that forms the basis for his complaint 
overwhelmingly contradicts.  For example, among these goals 
and expectations is that the offender show “[s]ome 
acknowledgment of sexual offense history” and “[a]cceptance 
of at least some personal responsibility for sexual assaults,” 
App. 20, but, according to the Report, Oliver “denies, 
minimizes or justifies much of his documented offense 
history,” App. 38, “did not demonstrate remorse for his crimes 
or empathy for his victims,” App. 39, and was “confusing and 
ultimately evasive” about his offense history,  App. 41.10   
                                                 
 10 Oliver also makes additional allegations for the first 
time in an affidavit attached to his appellate brief about an ex 
parte interaction he had with Roquet after her colleague had 
left the interview room.  Whatever concerns we would 
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  In short, Oliver has not sufficiently alleged any direct 
“causal link” between Roquet’s recommendation and his First 
Amendment protected activities.  Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333.  
Instead, the “causal link” Oliver alleges is between the 
recommendation and facially legitimate and uncontested 
medical observations that, by happenstance, result from those 
activities, and, absent allegations supporting a reasonable 
inference that Roquet based her recommendation on anything 
other than reasonable medical judgment, Oliver has not 
pleaded the causation required to state a prima facie claim of 
retaliation.  
 
C. 
 Even if Oliver had adequately stated a retaliation claim, 
he could not prevail because the right that he asserts was 
violated was not clearly established at the time Roquet wrote 
the TPRC Report.  A right is clearly established if “its contours 
are ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”  Sharp, 
669 F.3d at 159 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 
(2001)).  This inquiry requires us to “define the right allegedly 
                                                 
otherwise have with the introduction of this self-serving 
document on appeal, we do not recognize facts outside of the 
record and no such allegation appears in the complaint or any 
document before the District Court.  While we would always 
look skeptically at self-serving facts introduced in the middle 
of the litigation and only in the plaintiff’s own affidavit, “[w]e 
do not consider material on appeal that is outside of the district 
court record.”  Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2009).   
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violated at the appropriate level of specificity,” id., that is, ‘“in 
light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition,’” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 248 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 
Here, Oliver alleges that Roquet violated his First 
Amendment rights merely by identifying ways in which his 
legal activities affected his treatment and considering those 
observations among others in making a medical 
recommendation.  In the absence of facts supporting an 
improper motive, the right asserted by Oliver appears to be the 
right of a civilly committed detainee to be assessed for 
treatment progress without consideration of any medical 
consequences of his legal activities.  But “we have never 
indicated, let alone clearly established,” such a right.  Sharp, 
669 F.3d at 160.  And, for the reasons explained, medical 
professionals cannot be prohibited from taking into account 
such activities to the extent those activities on their face bear 
on the clinical assessments such professionals have been 
charged with rendering.  Necessarily, then, a reasonable STU 
psychologist in Roquet’s position would not have understood 
she was violating a constitutional right by basing her 
recommendation, at least in part, on the effects of Oliver’s legal 
activities on his medical progress.  For this reason as well, 
Roquet is entitled to qualified immunity. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Oliver discovery and remand the case 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
